The appointment is over, and the account goes quiet. An email address, a phone number, and one easy password stay on the booking site. The same password still opens the mailbox, a shop, and a payment side door. After the 5 October notice, the usual ending is: I rarely sign in there, the password is written as encrypted, and I can change it when My Page comes back. That ending skips the people the notice names. The logins on other services are the ones that have not been changed.

This page answers one question: after a booking site writes the taken passwords as “in an encrypted state,” and you change that one login or cannot change it yet, where do the email, the phone number, and the same password on other sites still sit. The facts follow ITmedia’s 5 October 2026 write-up by 梅林日奈子, read against the company’s 5 October notice and its 12 August first notice. The 5 October page on the company site is published as images, so the sentences quoted below are the ones ITmedia wrote out. This page does not explain how to use a flaw in a booking site. MyPassGen’s generator and strength check open without an account. A password you type stays in the browser.

Do the verb the notice already uses

On 5 October they asked anyone who uses the same login ID and password on other services to change the password on those services, and to watch email, phone calls, and postal mail that impersonate the company or other businesses. The same day they wrote that, as of publication, secondary harm from this incident had not been confirmed. That is a status on the publication date. The encrypted parenthesis is a separate sentence, and it does not put the other sites on pause.

Changing this login leaves the old password on other sites

When you can change the password on White Essence itself, you block the next login box on that site. The copy registered as of 5 August, and later taken out, is still the copy that left. Another website that still accepts the same password does not read this notice. Marking the booking site “password updated” does not retire the shop, the mailbox, or the payment login.

On 5 October, My Page was still stopped, with a fresh announcement promised when it returns. A closed My Page means you may have been unable to rotate the password on this one service. It does not mean other sites stopped accepting the old password. It does not pull back a copy that has already left. Change the services you can change now. Change White Essence again, to a password you have not reused, after My Page opens. Those are two clocks.

The 12 August notice already recommended the same move, before the company had confirmed that personal data had been carried out. That page was later marked with partial updates on 19 August and 10 September. The text you can read there now says: if you use the same ID and password on another company’s service, change the password on that other service promptly. On 5 October the same instruction comes back as a request, because an outside investigation had found that personal information had left the system. If you changed every site in August, and each new password is different, those new passwords are not the string registered on 5 August. If you changed only the booking site in August and left the old password everywhere else, those other sites are still the set the notice names.

The taken set is written as all or part of the information registered as of 5 August. The systems were paused from 12 August. ITmedia’s write-up does not add a separate line for whether fields updated between 6 August and 12 August were copied again. Change the password that was still in use on other sites on 5 August. If you kept reusing it until the shutdown, change that string too.

Which fields the 5 October notice actually lists

White Essence (ホワイトエッセンス) runs teeth-whitening and related services from Shibuya, Tokyo. ITmedia wrote that personal information for about 1.05 million accounts was disclosed through the unauthorized access announced in August. The set includes customers, people tied to affiliated clinics, and headquarters staff. The figure is a count of accounts. The write-up does not call it 1.05 million customers.

What left was all or part of the information registered as of 5 August. The listed items are: name, address, phone number, email address, date of birth, gender, employer, login ID and password (in an encrypted state), information about use of the service and how the company responded, and the company’s own management numbers. The exact items differ with what each person registered. One account does not imply that every column on that list left with it.

They wrote that they do not hold bank-account information, and that they have not confirmed a leak of users’ images. People whose contact details could be confirmed are being notified in turn. People for whom something outside the published list also leaked are being contacted individually. The entry point was a flaw in the booking-site program, used to reach the core system. Work on that flaw is finished. Service has resumed for the parts an outside firm confirmed as safe. My Page stays stopped. The company has reported the matter to Japan’s Personal Information Protection Commission and has consulted the police.

Date Sentence you can check on the notices
2026-08-05 Unauthorized access from outside was confirmed
2026-08-12 The booking site and core system were paused, and the first notice went out. It already recommended changing the same ID and password on other services
2026-10-05 An outside investigation found that personal information had been taken out. About 1.05 million accounts and a field list were published. My Page stayed stopped. Secondary harm had not been confirmed as of that day

The table restates dates that already appear in the two notices. It does not add an intrusion recipe, and it does not stretch “no secondary harm confirmed that day” into “these fields will not be used later.”

What “encrypted” proves on this notice

ITmedia’s clause is ログインIDとパスワード(暗号化された状態): login ID and password, with a parenthesis that says the state is encrypted. The parenthesis might modify only the password, or it might cover the login ID as well. The sentence does not split them. The write-up does not name an algorithm, say whether a salt was used, say where the key lived, or say whether the key left in the same access.

Those are two different technical sentences, and the notice has not chosen one. A one-way digest, the thing people call a password hash, is stored so a server can check “is this the same password.” Under ordinary storage you cannot turn that digest back into the password; someone who wants the original has to guess. Reversible encryption is the other sentence: whoever holds the key can recover the plaintext. If the key sat beside the ciphertext, or left in the same access, the distance between ciphertext and plaintext is that key. An earlier piece on Gyazo followed Helpfeel’s own word, password hash, in if you upload a screenshot with a password to Gyazo, what hashes, sessions, and image text still keep. This notice uses the word encrypted. The two companies did not publish the same word, so the leftover is not the same leftover.

What “in an encrypted state” currently proves is narrow. They did not write this field down as plaintext. It does not prove that someone outside the company cannot read the original password. It does not prove that the same string is safe to keep using on other sites. The next sentence in the same notice is more specific than the parenthesis: change the matching login on other services. They did not tell you to treat the field as already unreadable.

When you generate a new password on this machine, MyPassGen’s random mode runs from 6 to 128 characters, with a default of 16. Below 8 characters the page warns that the result is weaker. That is a character-space setting. It is not a measurement of the copy taken in August. The file box uses AES-256-GCM in the browser, and that choice cannot be read backwards into whichever algorithm this booking site used. Leave unnamed parameters unnamed.

Contact details, visit records, and phishing material

Even if nobody can recover the password field, name, address, phone, email, date of birth, gender, and employer can still be plaintext. Those fields are enough for a letter that uses your name, the service you used, and the phone number you left. On 5 October they asked people to watch for suspicious email, phone calls, and postal mail impersonating the company or other businesses. ITmedia’s write-up does not attach a confirmed scam sample, so this page does not invent one. The check is practical: if a call or a message asks for a password, a verification code, or a card number, do not submit it on that page. Open the 5 October notice by typing the site address yourself.

The write-up does not give a URL where you type an email address and learn whether you are on the list. Whether you are included follows the notices they send in turn, and the official page you open yourself. A notice that has not arrived yet is not, by itself, proof that you sit outside the 1.05 million accounts. People whose contact details are missing may not be reachable yet.

“Information about use of the service and how the company responded,” plus a management number, lets an impersonation name a particular appointment, a particular clinic, and an internal number. A specific detail is not the same thing as a message the company sent. They wrote that they do not hold bank-account information, and that they have not confirmed an image leak. Those two sentences draw the edge of the published list. They do not add card numbers or photos to the items already described as taken. Anyone with a leak outside that public list is supposed to hear individually, so the list is a public floor. It is not a full copy of one person’s file.

If the mailbox used the same password, change the mailbox first. The reason is that other sites send password resets to that address. The notice did not say the mail host itself was broken into. After the mailbox has its own new password, change the shops and payment logins that still reuse the old one. Changing only the booking site, while the mailbox still accepts the old password, leaves the reset path that can pull the other accounts back.

What is still left after you change this one login

The table splits “what you already did” from “what the notice named, and what can therefore still be left.” The left column is your action. The right columns stay inside what they have published. A guess is not written up as a fact.

What you did This one login What the notice named, and what can still remain
Nothing changed While My Page is stopped, the 5 August password may still work there An encrypted password copy, the login ID, contact details, and use records; the same password on other sites
You changed only this site, or My Page would not open so the change never landed A new password set after 5 August is not automatically part of the registration they described The old password can still work on other sites. Contact details can still be used to write and to call
In August you already gave each site a different new password On the booking site, check once more after My Page returns An encrypted copy of the old 5 August password may still exist. The new passwords are not in that registration. Contact details remain
You closed the account or stopped booking Later logins on this site can be turned off A copy that has already left does not disappear from the other party because you stopped using the service

The word “may” in that table comes from a parenthesis that never says where the key went. Treating the password field as exposed follows their request to change other services. Treating the contact details as still nameable follows the field list. Both readings stand at the same time.

Check it on this machine

Use a throwaway test password, a string you have never used on any account. Do not paste the live White Essence password, the mailbox password, or a payment password into a lookup page, a chatbot, or this article. The list on this machine does not contain the database that was taken.

  1. On paper, or in a password manager, list the sites that used the same login ID and password as the booking site. Write the site names only. This step does not require typing the password into another web page.
  2. When you change those sites, type the official address yourself, or open the official app you already installed. Do not follow a link inside a “breach check” or “emergency reset” email.
  3. Open the password generator. In the developer tools, open Network and keep the log. In random mode, take the default 16 characters or longer, and generate one. Look at the URL, the query, and the body of each new request. The string you just generated should not be in them. Generation runs in the browser. The page opens without an account.
  4. Write the new password into the mailbox first, then into each other service that still reuses the old one. One password per site. After that, copy an unrelated short sentence so the old password does not sit in the system clipboard history.
  5. If you want to see whether a string looks like a common weak password, open the strength check and type only the throwaway test string. The page requests data/leaked-top10k.txt, currently about 860 lines of public weak passwords, and the request body should be empty. After you type, the new requests should not contain that string. A hit means it looks like a public weak password. A miss means it is not on this list.
  6. Back in the mailbox, look for mail impersonating the booking site, an affiliated clinic, or some other business. Do not submit a password, a verification code, or a card number on a page that arrived inside the message. The official notice is the address you opened yourself.

Step 5 cannot tell you whether your account is one of the 1.05 million. That file is a list of common weak passwords. It is not White Essence’s database, and it is not a full-web Have I Been Pwned lookup. The password you type is not uploaded. If some page insists that you POST a live password before it will “check the breach,” you are making a second copy. The difference between a local comparison and a full-web lookup is in local leaked-password lists vs Have I Been Pwned: what each check proves.

Pasting the old password into a chatbot to ask “is this strong” or “does this count as leaked” hands the plaintext to that history. Ask about the sentences in the notice, and replace the password with a placeholder you can recognize. That boundary is already split by product switch in what to redact before you paste a password into ChatGPT or Gemini.

How to hand a new password to someone else

After the new password exists, chat and an email body keep plaintext if you have to give it to a colleague or a family member once. A short secret that should be read once can go out as a one-time link. The key sits after # in the URL, in the shape s.html?id={id}#{key}. Browsers keep the fragment after # off the request line sent to the server. The server stores ciphertext. Creating a link and reading one are both public. Neither needs an account. The full link is still a credential. A preview or a forward hands the whole string over.

Why the fragment stays off the request line is in when you send a password once, why the decryption key belongs after # in the URL. What Sent, a forward, and a lock-screen preview keep from an email body is in if you put a temporary password in an email, what Sent, forwards, and phone previews still keep. A file you need to open again belongs in the file box: AES-256-GCM on this machine, one file up to 5 GB, output as .lock or .enc. A password is not a file. Generate it, then save a different one on each site.

After My Page returns, change this booking site to a new password you have never reused. Until that page opens, the notice already allows the work that matters: change the other sites, and refuse to hand over the next password inside a suspicious contact.

FAQ

They wrote “encrypted.” Do the other sites still need a change?

The notice does not name an algorithm, and it does not say whether the key left with the copy. The same notice says: if other services use the same login ID and password, change the password on those services. Follow that sentence. The parenthesis records that the field was written as encrypted. It does not record that someone outside the company cannot read the original password.

My Page is closed. Does that mean there is nothing to do?

A stopped My Page means this one login may have been impossible to change, and they will announce when it returns. Other sites do not follow that switch. Contact details are already on the field list. Change the reused passwords you can change now. When My Page opens, give this site a new password of its own.

The local check missed. Does that mean I am outside this breach?

No. The local list is about 860 public weak passwords, and the comparison stays in the browser. It answers whether the string looks like a weak password an attacker would try early. It does not contain this company’s 5 August registration, and it does not stand in for a full-web hash corpus. After a miss, sites that still share a password still need a different new password each.

I never booked anything in Japan. Why does this notice matter?

If you never registered with this company, you are not in the 1.05 million accounts they described. The way to read the notice still applies the next time any service writes a taken password as “encrypted.” Look for a sentence that also tells you to change reused logins, and look for whether contact details are already on the list. Waiting for the algorithm name delays the mailbox change.

Do the generator and the strength check require an account? Is a live password uploaded?

No account is required. Generation and the strength check both finish in the browser. The standard you can see is Network: the word-list file may appear, and the string you typed or just generated should not appear on the request line or in the body. The words “not uploaded” on the page are confirmed by that look.