A lot of people set the So-net mail password to the same string as My Page, a shop, or a work mailbox. After the 27 October notice, the usual ending is two sentences: they said the member password did not leave, and those four mail passwords have already been initialized, so the other websites can wait. Each sentence drops half of the same table.

This page answers one question: after the provider writes that the member login password did not leave, while four mail passwords were taken and then initialized, where the mail app, the basic mailbox, and the same password on other websites still sit. The facts are the 27 October 2026 notice from Sony Network Communications, the FAQ published the same day, and the ITmedia report at 19:48 that day by 梅林日奈子. This page does not describe how the unauthorized access got in. The cause line says a third party’s unauthorized access, and that the investigation is still open. MyPassGen’s generator and strength check open without an account. A password you type stays in the browser.

Do the verbs the notice already printed

On 27 October they asked anyone who uses those four mail services to set the mail password again from My Page. At the same time: do not answer email, SMS, or phone calls about this; do not open links in the message body; do not open attachments. The same notice says the mail passwords for those four services were initialized that day. Initialization is the password on those four servers. The copy that has already left is still outside, because a server that rejects the old password does not pull that copy back. “The member login password did not leave” explains the member-record column. It does not explain these four mail passwords.

These four were reset. Other login boxes still sit on the old password

Sony Network Communications initialized the four mail passwords. That blocks the next attempt to collect those four mailboxes with the old string. The copy taken in the 19 October access is still outside. Another website that still accepts the same password does not read this notice, and it does not read their initialization switch. A new mail password you set on My Page does not expire the shop.

The FAQ puts the start of the forced change at about 10:00 on 27 October 2026, carried out in sequence. The notice says the initialization was done that day. It does not say every address stopped accepting the old password at 10:00 exactly. During those hours, the notice does not say, address by address, whether a mailbox not yet reached could still send and receive with the old password. Change the service you can change. The sentence “the company said they would initialize it today” is a different fact from the completion state you can see on My Page.

The FAQ explains the missing advance warning. Once the address and the mail password had left, a third party who obtained them was already in a position to read, send, and receive mail with a mail program and with So-net Webmail. They call it an emergency measure. That sentence proves the string could be used to send and receive before the initialization. It does not say every mailbox had already been read. The 27 October notice says that, within what they knew at that point, they had not confirmed secondary harm caused by this incident. “Not confirmed” does not make the external copy expire on its own, and it does not mean nobody will later write or call with your name and phone number.

The member-record column on the notice says the password did not leave. The FAQ names the user-ID password for My Page among the passwords not confirmed to have left. If you typed the mail password into My Page as well, My Page checks the string you type. It does not check whether that column was named in the notice. A field left off the list does not block reuse. The connection password is the same kind of sentence. The FAQ lists “the connection password required for some services to go online” among examples not yet confirmed to have left. “Some” is not every product. The connection ID itself is in the member-record column. The ID left, and one password column was not written out. Both sentences can be true at once.

If, before 19 October, each site already had its own password, those login boxes do not contain these four mail passwords. The old password that left can still sit outside. It fails on the sites you later set on their own. Name, phone number, and email address do not depend on password reuse. They stay on the field list.

Former members who cancelled from March 2026 onward are inside the counts. Cancelling this provider does not delete a copy that has already left. The FAQ says they keep member information for a period after cancellation, for the final month’s bill and for support inquiries. The notice says people who had cancelled by the last day of February 2026 are outside this mail item, and the plala section uses the same date. Read that date on the notice. “I stopped using it a long time ago” is not the same sentence as the cutoff they printed.

Which fields the 27 October notice actually lists

So-net is the internet access service from Sony Network Communications. The same notice lists plala (S course) member information in a separate count. ITmedia describes plala (S course) as a connection service for docomo Hikari that carries over So-net connection settings. That sentence is the report’s gloss. The notice itself keeps the two member tables apart. For NURO, and for services other than the ones listed, the notice says no information leak was confirmed. ITmedia names the fiber service NURO Hikari in that group, calls the combined member records about 2.59 million, and prints 2,585,481, which is what the two tables add up to. This page uses the notice’s line items. The rounded figure is not a new headcount.

The timeline is the notice’s. On Monday 19 October 2026 an outsider made unauthorized access to the So-net member database. On Friday 23 October they confirmed that access. After the confirmation they stopped the server in question and cut off communication from that source. On Saturday 24 October the investigation found that personal information had left, and they had the items and the counts. On Tuesday 27 October they published the notice, initialized the mail passwords in item 2, and reported the case to the Personal Information Protection Commission. The cause is still under investigation. The notice does not give an entry point, and this page does not invent one. The FAQ adds one sentence: after the server was stopped, no new leak was confirmed. That sentence is about pulls after the stop. It is silent about the copy that had already left.

Member records are two tables, and both say the password did not leave. So-net member information is 2,141,986 records: 1,869,771 current members, and 272,215 former members who cancelled from March 2026 onward. The fields are name, phone number, email address, user ID, date of birth, gender, and the ID used for the internet connection. plala (S course) is 443,495 records: 422,365 current members, and 21,130 former members who cancelled from March 2026 onward. The fields match the first table, and the password line matches too. The two tables add up to 2,585,481. The FAQ’s “up to 2.586 million” is a rounded ceiling, not a second census.

The mail password is a separate item. The notice places it among current So-net members and former members who cancelled from March 2026 onward, so 54,401 is not a further crowd stacked on top of 2,141,986. The plala column does not say that mail passwords left. The notice does not give a cross-count of people who hold both contracts. The contract list on the My Page you open is the check.

Item Count and password sentence on the notice
So-net member records 2,141,986. Current members 1,869,771. Former members who cancelled from March 2026 onward: 272,215. The password did not leave
plala (S course) member records 443,495. Current members 422,365. Former members who cancelled from March 2026 onward: 21,130. The password did not leave
Mail service (G) 24,655. Free. Domains include @***.gyao.ne.jp, @***.gate01.com, @***.pbc.ne.jp, @***.highway.ne.jp. The address and the mail password left
A-Box (additional mailbox) 17,672. Paid. The notice writes @***.so-net.ne.jp. The FAQ writes @abox***.so-net.ne.jp. The address and the mail password left
So-net VAIO Mail 7,005. Paid. The notice writes @***.vaio.ne.jp. The FAQ writes @****.vaio.ne.jp. The address and the mail password left
PostPet mail account service 5,069. Paid. Domain @postpet***.so-net.ne.jp. The address and the mail password left
Bank accounts 16 records. Institution name, bank number, branch name, branch number, account type, account number, and account-holder name. They do not hold the account PIN. plala is outside these 16
Password-reset notices 7 records of member notification documents issued for password resets. Those passwords were initialized. The customers are contacted individually

The four address counts add up to 54,401. The FAQ calls the same total about 54,000 addresses. Which item your own address falls under is the contract status on the My Page you open yourself. The notice’s entrance is so-net.ne.jp/mypage/. Do not enter it from a link in an SMS. ITmedia describes Mail service (G) as the service for former GyaO users. That is the report’s explanation. The notice itself gives the service name and the domains above.

The 16 bank records and the 7 notices should stay visible beside 54,401. Items 1 through 5 include no credit card data. The FAQ says they do not hold credit card information, so no card data left. The account PIN is also a field they say they do not hold. The FAQ’s examples of passwords not confirmed to have left are three: the user-ID password for My Page; the connection password required for some services to go online; and the mail password of the free basic mailbox. The FAQ also says the free basic mailbox is confirmed to be outside this incident. Those three examples mean “not confirmed to have left.” They do not mean “already proved impossible to obtain by some other path.”

The table repeats items the notice and the FAQ have already written. It does not contain parameters of the unauthorized access, and it does not stretch “no new leak after the server stopped” into “the external copy of the password expires by itself.”

What “the member password never left” and “they could already send mail” each prove

Both sentences are in the public text, and they are not the same key. “The password did not leave” sits under the So-net and plala member fields. The mail-password leak is the next item, with four services and address counts. Using the first sentence to cover the second item drops half the table.

The FAQ does not call the mail password plaintext, a hash, or a named cipher. It states a result: a third party who obtained the information was already able to read, send, and receive mail with a mail program and with So-net Webmail. A mail server accepts the password itself. Before the initialization, the external copy contained material that could sign in to these four services. They did not write an algorithm name. Do not supply one for them. In the earlier software-site case, the company later told a reporter that the passwords had left in a decrypted state. See what voiding that login still leaves on other sites after a software site says the key never left, but the passwords left already decrypted. This notice has no equivalent sentence. What you can check is “they could already send and receive” and “initialized on 27 October,” not the way the password was stored.

Initialization changes which string these four services accept from then on. It does not change whether the old string still works in another login box. It does not rewrite the old value saved in the mail program on your computer. The FAQ splits getting mail working again into two steps. First, set the mail password again on each service’s page. Second, if you use Outlook or another mail program, change the password field in that program to the new value. If you use only So-net Webmail, confirm that the new password signs in. The company changed the item on the server. The field in the program is yours to change. Until you replace the old value in the program, that string still sits in the account settings on this machine. A server that rejects it is a different fact from another website rejecting it.

The FAQ says the new password usually shows up within a few minutes, and sometimes takes as long as 30 minutes. Those 30 minutes are about when the new password takes effect on their mail service. They do not describe other websites, and they do not describe the mail program on a computer you have not opened yet.

The reset needs the user ID and the My Page password. The FAQ says that if you cannot sign in to My Page, try the user-ID check and the password reset; if that still fails, contact the dedicated desk. The desk and the phone number are the ones on the 27 October notice you open after typing so-net.ne.jp. The special number printed there is 0120-36-8887. The notice says weekdays and Saturday, 10:00 to 18:00; calls on 27 October were taken until 20:00; and 1 November and 3 November are also answered. The FAQ repeats the weekday and Saturday hours, and 1 November and 3 November. A different number in an SMS does not belong to this page because it looks similar.

When you generate a replacement on this machine, MyPassGen’s random mode runs from 6 to 128 characters, with a default of 16. Below 8 characters the page warns that the result is weaker. That is the character space on this side. It is not a measurement of how So-net stored the password. The file encryption page uses AES-256-GCM in the browser, and that algorithm cannot reverse-engineer which cipher their member database used. An algorithm name the notice left blank stays blank.

Names, two IDs, and mail that pretends to be them

Your mail password can sit outside the 54,401 and the member fields can still hold your name, phone number, email address, user ID, date of birth, gender, and connection ID. Those fields are enough for a message to write your name, your phone number, and your user ID. The connection ID and the user ID are different things. The FAQ says the user ID signs in to My Page, and the connection ID is the ID you enter when connecting to the internet. A message pretending to be them can include both. A specific detail is not proof that they sent it.

The notice opens the impact section by saying customers in scope will each receive an apology. The FAQ says identifying who is in scope, and confirming the range, is still in progress. Bank accounts and the notification documents are the two groups they say will be contacted individually. The four mail services ask customers who use them to change the password themselves, rather than wait for a letter before deciding whether they are listed. A letter that has not arrived is not, by itself, proof that you sit outside the 2,585,481 records. Whether you used those four services is what the My Page you opened shows.

The check for an incoming message is this: when the other side asks for a password, a verification code, an account PIN, or a card number, leave that page unfilled. Type so-net.ne.jp yourself and open the 27 October 2026 notice at /info/2026/20261027_0001.html. Credit cards are outside the five items, and they say they do not hold the account PIN. A message that puts “this leak” in the same breath as “please enter the account PIN or the card number again” is already outside the notice. A form outside that scope is an extra form, and it is one you should leave empty.

If a mailbox you can still open uses the same password, give it a new password of its own first. Other websites send password resets to that mailbox. The notice does not say the host of your other mailboxes was broken into. After the four mail passwords were initialized, those four services stop accepting the old string. If the basic mailbox was set to the same string, the FAQ places it outside this incident. The server will not change the basic mailbox because A-Box was initialized. Other websites will not either. Changing only these four, while the basic mailbox and My Page stay on the old string, leaves reset mail and other login boxes able to pull the account back.

The 16 bank records do not include the PIN. If the individual contact has not arrived, an SMS that says “account check” is not proof that it is your turn. If the account number and the holder’s name are among the 16, a caller can recite the branch and the account number. Reciting the account number is still not a reason to hand over the PIN. plala members are outside these 16. “I am on plala” does not mean the name and the email address are outside the leak. plala member records are a separate table of 443,495.

After the four mail passwords were reset, what is still left

The table splits “what you already did” from “what the notice and the FAQ name, and what can therefore still remain.” The left column is your action. The right column stays inside what they have published.

What you did These four mail services What can still remain
You changed nothing The company initializes them in sequence from about 10:00 on 27 October. You still set a new password on My Page, and you still replace the old value in the mail program A copy of the old password, plus name, phone, email, and both IDs. The same string, if it is still on other websites, on the basic mailbox, or on My Page
You set a new password only on these four The new password should stay on these four. The notice does not say how it is stored The old string can still work elsewhere. Name, phone, and both IDs can still be used to write and to call
Each site already had a different password Confirm these four now have a new one, and replace the old value in the program The old string may still sit outside. It fails on the sites you already split. Contact details and both IDs remain
You cancelled in March 2026 or later You can stop signing in to this provider The notice counts these former members. A copy that has already left does not disappear because you cancelled
You had cancelled by the last day of February 2026 The notice places this group outside the mail item and outside the plala item Read the date on the notice. “Cancelled earlier than that” is a different sentence from “every former member is outside the list”

“They could already send and receive,” in that table, rests on the FAQ’s sentence about why the change was forced. “Other websites” rests on the initialization being written only against the mail passwords in item 2. “The member login password did not leave” explains that one sentence in the member column. It does not explain reuse.

Check it on this machine

Use a throwaway test password, a string you have never used on any account. Do not paste a live So-net password, a mailbox password, or a payment password into a lookup page, a chatbot, or this article. The list on this machine does not contain the member database that was taken.

  1. On paper, or in a password manager, list whether you used these four mail services, which websites used the same string as the mail password, and whether the basic mailbox and My Page are that same string. Write the service names only. This step does not require typing the password into another web page.
  2. Type so-net.ne.jp yourself and open the 27 October notice and the FAQ. Do not follow a link inside a “breach check” or “emergency reset” email or SMS. If you used those four services, reset from My Page the way the FAQ describes. If you use Outlook or another program, change the password field in the program after the reset is done. If you use only webmail, sign in with the new password and confirm it. If the new password has not taken effect yet, the FAQ says you can wait from a few minutes up to 30 minutes, then change the value in the program.
  3. Open the password generator. In the developer tools, open Network and preserve the log. In random mode, take the default of 16 characters or longer, and generate one. Look at the URL, the query, and the body of each new request. The string you just generated should not be in them. Generation runs in the browser. The page opens without an account. Below 8 characters the page warns that the result is weaker. A replacement password should sit above that line.
  4. Write the new password first into any mailbox that still accepts the old string, including the basic mailbox if it was set to the same string and sits outside this incident. Then write a different new password into each other service that still reuses it, and into My Page if that login is the same string. One password per place. Do not copy the new password for these four back onto the sites you just changed. After that, copy an unrelated short sentence so the old password does not sit in the system clipboard history.
  5. If you want to see whether a string looks like a common weak password, open the strength check and type only the throwaway test string. The page requests data/leaked-top10k.txt, currently 862 lines of public weak passwords. The file opens with strings such as 123456, password, and qwerty. The request body should be empty. After you type, the new requests should not contain that string. A hit means it looks like a weak password on this list. A miss means it is not on this list. Do not hand over a password you still use in exchange for a sentence that claims to say whether you are among the 54,401.
  6. Back in the mailbox and in SMS, look for messages and calls pretending to be this company, So-net, or plala. Do not submit a password, a verification code, an account PIN, or a card number on a page that arrived inside the message. The official notice is the address you opened yourself. The phone number is the one printed on that page.

Step 5 cannot tell you whether you are among the 2,585,481 records or the 54,401 addresses. That list is common weak passwords. It is not So-net’s member database, and it is not a full-web breach search. The password you type is not uploaded. If a web page requires the live password in plaintext before it will “check the leak,” you are making a second copy. The difference between a local comparison and a full-web lookup is in what a local leaked-password list and a Have I Been Pwned lookup each prove.

Pasting the old password into a chatbot and asking whether it “counts as leaked” hands the plaintext to that chat history. Ask about sentences in the notice and the FAQ, and replace the password with a placeholder you recognize. That boundary is split by product switch in what to redact before you paste a password into ChatGPT or Gemini. This page does not repeat it.

How to hand a new password to someone else

After you generate a new password, chat and the body of an email keep the plaintext if you must hand it to a family member or a colleague once. A short secret that is needed only once can go out as a one-time link: the key sits after # in the URL, in the form s.html?id={id}#{key}. Under the way browsers handle a fragment, the key after # does not enter the request line sent to the server. The server stores ciphertext. Creating and reading are both public. No account is required. The full link is still a credential. A preview or a forward hands the whole string over.

Why the fragment stays off the request line is in why the decryption key belongs after # in the URL when you send a password once. Sent mail, forwards, and the lock-screen preview keep the body, as described in what Sent, forwards, and phone previews still keep if you put a temporary password in an email. A file you need to open again can be encrypted on this machine with AES-256-GCM in the file encryption box. One file can be up to 5 GB. The output is .lock or .enc. A password is not a file. Prefer the generator, and store a different one in each place.

What 27 October already lets you do is this: reset those four, replace the old value in the mail program, change every other login that still matches the old string, and refuse to hand over the next password inside a suspicious contact. The notice does not turn “the member password did not leave” into “the other websites can stay as they are.”

FAQ

The member password did not leave. Do the other websites still need a change?

The notice writes “the password did not leave” in the member-record column. The next item separately confirms that 54,401 mail passwords had left, and that they were initialized on 27 October. Another website that uses that mail password checks the password itself. A member column that omits the password does not expire a mail password that has already left. If the basic mailbox and My Page were set to the same string, they are also outside the scope of this initialization.

The company already initialized them. Is the job finished?

Initialization finished the old login on those four mail services. You still set a new password on My Page that is used only there, and you still replace the old value saved in Outlook or another program, the way the FAQ describes. If you use only webmail, confirm that the new password can sign in. Where the old string is still in place, those login boxes keep accepting the string that left. The notice does not say how the new password is stored, so the new one stays off every other website as well.

The local check missed. Does that place me outside these records?

No. The local list is 862 lines, and the comparison stays in the browser. It answers whether the string looks like a common weak password. It does not hold this company’s member database, and it does not stand in for a full-web hash corpus. After a miss, websites that still share these four mail passwords still need a different new password each.

I have never used So-net. Why does the notice still matter?

If you never held a membership here, you sit outside the 2,585,481 records they described. The way to read this notice still applies the next time someone says “the login password did not leave, so there is nothing to do.” Look in the same write-up for another password that has already been confirmed to have left, and look at which item they initialized. One item that did not leave, and another item that could already send and receive mail, can both be true.

Do the generator and the check require an account, and does a live password get uploaded?

No account is required. Generation and the strength check both finish in the browser. The standard you can see is Network: the word-list file may appear, and the string you typed or just generated should not appear on the request line or in the body. The words “not uploaded” on the page are confirmed by that look.