mSecure is the password manager from mSeven Software. A vault can stay on one device, sync through mSecure Cloud, or use another path such as Wi-Fi sync. After the 3 November email, a common place to stop is two sentences: they said the copy was encrypted, and they have no evidence the secrets were opened, so the hundreds of saved rows can wait. Each of those sentences drops half of the reply that contains them.
This article answers one question: after a password manager says an encrypted copy was taken, and that there is no evidence the secrets were opened, where the old passwords, authenticator seeds, and the copy that already left still sit once you change the master password, uninstall the app, and remove the passkeys. The record is the 3 November email pasted on the support forum, the longer reply readable on that forum on 5 November, and Lawrence Abrams’s BleepingComputer report of 4 November at 11:00. The encryption layout is checked against mSecure’s own security model. How the party got in is outside this piece. Neither notice names an entry point. MyPassGen’s generator and strength check open without an account. A password you type stays in the browser. This site does not keep a password vault.
Do the verbs in the reply first
The longer reply recommends changing the master password, changing vital stored passwords, resetting two-factor authentication, and replacing passkeys and other sensitive information. The same text says deleting mSecure will have no impact, that the issue only pertains to users who were synching with mSecure Cloud, and that mSeven has no evidence the other party has accessed the secrets. Those sentences come with no field list, and they do not say the copy on the other disk will be retrieved. Type msecure.com and support.msecure.com yourself. Leave alone a link inside a later email that calls itself an urgent reset.
A new master password leaves their encrypted copy where it is
Changing the master password changes the string you will use next time to sign in to this app, and the string that wraps the account key on this device. A copy the other party already holds does not read the Save you press today. Uninstalling the app does not retrieve that copy either. The longer reply fixes the point in one sentence: deleting mSecure will have no impact on this situation. Former users are on the recipient list of the 3 November email. Closing the account, and removing the app, leave the copy that has already gone.
Read the cloud-sync sentence whole. The reply says this issue only pertains to users who were synching with mSecure Cloud. Someone who only used Wi-Fi sync, or who kept the vault on a single device, sits outside that sentence. The sentence names who this notice covers. It does not make a file you export later safe. On the support thread, after the email arrived, one person described exporting the vault as a plaintext CSV and then sorting the rows in a spreadsheet. The company did not ask for a CSV. Once that file is on disk, it is a new plaintext copy. The sentence that calls the cloud copy encrypted does not cover it.
Deleting one password inside the manager deletes the manager’s row. The website still accepts the old password on the next sign-in, until you change it on that website. Two-factor authentication and passkeys work the same way. The authenticator seed and the passkey registration live on the website. A delete inside the manager does not send that site a request to retire the old key. If the site’s security page still lists the old passkey, a sign-in can still use that key. If the copy once held an old seed or old key material, deleting a local row does not erase that copy. After you reset the method on the website, the website stops accepting the old one. Whether the old material is still inside the taken copy is a field the notice does not list.
If the master password is the same string as the mailbox, a cloud drive, or another site, those login forms check the characters you type. They do not read mSecure’s security email, and they do not read the sentence that the vault is encrypted. Change the mailbox that can reset the other accounts first, because a reset message lands in that inbox. That is an order of work. It is not a victim-field list the company published. The reply calls the stored passwords to change “vital,” and it gives no names.
What the 3 November email and the later reply each say
mSecure lets you keep passwords, passkeys, one-time codes, and other sensitive rows in one vault, and sync them between devices. The 3 November subject line is Important security notice about your mSecure account. A thread on the support forum that day pastes the body, and several people write that they received the same message. On 4 November BleepingComputer reported the email and wrote that the reporter had put questions to mSeven, with no company reply by publication. This article does not treat the forum thread as a notice pinned on the company homepage. What can be checked is narrower: the email body is pasted on the official support forum, and the report’s sentences match that paste.
The scope sentence says you are receiving the email because you are a current or former mSecure customer. The reason sentence says mSeven recently learned of suspicious activity associated with the mSecure password management application. The response sentence says the company launched an investigation, took steps to mitigate the issue, and engaged outside cybersecurity experts. The advice sentence uses “may include”: immediately protect all confidential information stored in the app, which may include changing passwords, resetting or re-enrolling two-factor authentication, or removing existing passkeys. The email does not name a system, does not say whether data was taken, does not give a headcount, does not date the activity, and does not say whether the thing to change is the master password or every row in the vault.
The questions under that paste therefore sit on four points. Is the change the master password, or every stored password? Is two-factor only mSecure’s own, or every site whose seed is in the vault? Is the passkey the one that signs in to mSecure, or every passkey the vault holds? Does a credit-card row count as confidential? The 3 November email answers none of the four. It also does not say whether card numbers are in any copy. If the vault held card numbers, the later phrase “any other sensitive information” puts that class inside the work they recommend, and it does not confirm that a card number was read. Leave the sentence short of “card numbers have already leaked.”
The 4 November report says a support reply, forwarded by a customer, states that an unauthorized party acquired an encrypted database from mSecure Cloud, that the contents belong to current and former users, that the company has no evidence the party accessed the confidential information, and that the issue only involves users synching with mSecure Cloud. On 5 November the thread More vital information about the mSecure incident carries a longer text. The person who posted it writes that the mSecure team sent it to him. This article quotes the parts that overlap the report and that can be read sentence by sentence on the forum.
The time phrase in that text is “earlier this week.” It does not date the moment the copy was taken. The core sentence says an unauthorized actor acquired an encrypted copy of a database containing information belonging to current and former users of mSecure, and that, importantly, mSeven has no evidence the actor has accessed the confidential information stored in the database in mSecure Cloud. The advice is more specific than the 3 November email, and it is labeled usual practice: mSeven continues to recommend that customers change their master password, change vital stored passwords, reset two-factor authentication methods, and replace passkeys and any other sensitive information. The same passage repeats that the database involved was encrypted and that there is no evidence the confidential information was accessed. Two further sentences follow. Steps have been taken to bolster security against future unauthorized activity. Unfortunately, deleting mSecure will have no impact on this situation. The scope sentence says this issue only pertains to users that were synching with the mSecure Cloud. The spelling in the original is synching. The close says mSeven has no evidence that mSecure is not currently safe for use.
Both texts still omit an entry point, the date the copy was taken, a headcount, a field table, and any statement that the matter was reported to police. Leave those blanks empty. A number from a group chat does not fill them. In the report, BleepingComputer sets the 2022 LastPass backup theft beside this case, including later offline guessing of weak master passwords. That comparison belongs to the report. mSecure’s security notes describe a different layout, and both documents are public at once. The comparison is not a field list for this copy. Headcount, date, and fields wait until they appear in a notice. Where the original is silent, this article stays silent.
What “encrypted copy” and “no evidence” each establish
“Acquired an encrypted copy” establishes two things they are willing to say: they call the copy that left encrypted, and they say an unauthorized party has it. The sentence does not name the key that produced the ciphertext. It does not say key material is absent from the same database. It does not say that, after you change the master password, the file already in the other party’s hands turns into new ciphertext.
“No evidence that the other party has accessed the secrets” establishes their position as of that reply: they do not have evidence of an opening. It leaves unstated whether the copy can be opened, and whether it stays unopened later. Placement matters. The longer reply puts “no evidence” in the same passage as the recommendation to change vital stored passwords. That recommendation is wider than “change only the master password.” The 3 November “may include” becomes “continues to recommend,” and the later text names the master password and the vital stored passwords. That is still short of “every row has already been read.” It is the range of work they give while no field list exists.
They call the change advice standard best practice, and they say it should be part of routine security practices. The label keeps the recommendation separate from a confirmation that the copy has been opened. Keep both sentences. Usual practice is their reason for recommending a change while they report no evidence of an opening. It is not a mechanism that makes a copy already gone expire on its own.
“No evidence the app is unsafe to keep using” and “deleting the app has no impact” can stand together. The first says they do not have evidence the other party still controls the app. The second says uninstalling does not change a copy already taken. Continuing to open the app, and a copy remaining outside, are two states the reply allows at the same time. The reply does not say whether a later sync rewrites cloud contents under a new key. It does not say the file the other party already holds will receive an update.
People who only used Wi-Fi sync, or who stayed on one device, are outside this notice by the scope sentence. That sentence still leaves three other objects untouched: plaintext you export yourself, the authentication email in the mailbox, and reuse of the master password on other sites. The authentication email is a delivery path the security notes themselves describe. This notice does not name it as something taken. Reuse is separate from whether this copy can be opened. The other site accepts the password characters.
Where the security notes place the 46-character account key
mSecure’s security notes say data is encrypted before it leaves the device, that they use AES-256, and that a random 46-character account key is created on the device and is never stored on their servers. The same page says the account password does more than unlock the app. It takes part in the encryption that protects the key, so that only the user can unlock the information. The November reply’s phrase is “master password.” The security page’s phrase is “Account Password.” Both documents are talking about the password that opens mSecure. This article does not invent a second secret behind the two labels.
At signup, the notes say, the app encrypts a known piece of text with the account key. The page’s example is a copyright notice. That ciphertext is stored on the account. The account key itself stays off the server. It is encrypted with the account password and kept on the device. On a new device you sign in with email and the account password, then scan a QR code or type the encrypted account key. Synced data is decrypted only on the device.
The same page offers a calculation: a 46-character random key makes brute force unrealistic under the assumptions they publish. The speed they write is 360 billion guesses a second, and opening one such key would take about 1.5×1049 years. They add that an average search would land at half that time, and that the chance inside the next billion years is still tiny beside a universe they date at 13.8 billion years. This is an example on the security page. It is not a measurement of the November copy. The example assumes the guesser is attacking that 46-character random key itself.
Two further sentences on that page have to stay apart. One says the account key is never sent to them, so it cannot be reset, intercepted, or bypassed. The other says that, so you can authenticate on a new device, they email you the encrypted account key, as a QR code or as a character string. The account-authentication page is more specific about that mail. The key in the message is encrypted with the mSecure account password. The message carries a QR code, the encrypted key written out as characters, and a PDF that holds both. A section of the same page says that, on mSecure 6, if iCloud Drive is enabled for mSecure, the encrypted account key is stored there, and a valid copy lets a new sign-in finish without the QR code. The November notices do not mention the authentication email, and they do not mention iCloud. This article does not move either place onto the list of objects this incident has named.
“The raw account key is not kept on the server” is one sentence. “The mailbox, or iCloud, holds an account key wrapped by the account password” is another. If the cloud vault text is encrypted only by the 46-character key that is not on the server, then guessing the account password alone does not open the vault text. That is the design the security notes describe. The November notice does not confirm that the taken copy matches this premise, and it does not list whether the known ciphertext, or any other material, is inside the copy. The years on the older page do not stand in for a field table the new notice lacks.
The account password still governs one object it can reach: the wrapped account key in that email. What protects that object is the strength of the account password, not the years attached to guessing the 46-character key. The notice does not say the authentication email was taken. If the account password is short, and if the same string is already in use on other sites, it still needs its own long password used only here. The reason is that email and those other sites. The reason is not a proof, missing from the notice, that the cloud vault text can be guessed from the master password.
Whether a new account password re-wraps the account key on the device, and whether it rewrites cloud sync from that moment on, is a procedure neither the security notes nor the November notice spell out step by step. The copy that has already left is outside every sentence that would say the file updates along with you. When BleepingComputer uses LastPass’s weak master passwords as a comparison, the comparison is the class of vault whose ciphertext key is derived directly from the master password. mSecure’s security notes say the vault text uses a separate random account key. Keep that sentence beside the comparison. The comparison cannot fill the field table the notice left blank.
What is still left after the master password, the app, and the passkeys
The table separates which side each action touches. The notice does not list the fields inside the copy, so the last column uses a firm sentence only where they already wrote one. Everywhere else it says the notice is silent.
| What you did | What it changes | The copy already taken, and everywhere else |
|---|---|---|
| Change the mSecure master password | The string for later sign-in to this app, and the wrap around the account key on this device | The notice does not say their copy updates or comes back. Other sites ignore this master password unless you reused the same string there |
| Change the password on one website | The password that site checks next time | That site only. The notice does not say, field by field, whether the old password is in the copy. A site you have not changed still accepts the old string |
| Delete one password only inside mSecure | The row in the manager | The copy stays. The website still accepts the old password |
| Reset two-factor authentication on the website | The site issues a new authenticator seed, and the old seed stops working there | That site only. The notice does not say whether the old seed is still in the copy |
| Delete the authenticator row only inside mSecure | The row in the manager | The website still accepts a 6-digit code from the old seed |
| Remove the passkey on the website and create a new one | The list of keys that site has registered | That site only. The notice does not say whether the old key was ever in the copy |
| Remove the passkey only inside mSecure | The row in the manager | The site’s passkey list remains, and a sign-in can still use the old key |
| Delete the mSecure app | The program on this device | The reply says this has no impact. Passwords, authenticators, and passkeys on each website stay as they were |
| Export the vault as a plaintext CSV | A readable file added on this machine | The company did not ask for this. The file is already plaintext, separate from the claim that the cloud copy is encrypted |
“That site only” is about the website side. A new bank password leaves the mailbox on the old string if the mailbox still uses it. Passkeys are registered per site. A new passkey on one site does not revoke an old passkey on another.
Check it on this machine
Use public pages and one throwaway string. Keep the live master password, card numbers, and authenticator seeds out of lookup pages, chat, and spreadsheets. Whether cloud sync was on is a setting in your own client. The notice names the scope as mSecure Cloud. This article does not invent a menu name.
- Type the support-forum address yourself. Open the 3 November thread and the 5 November thread, then the BleepingComputer report of 4 November. Copy the verbs onto paper:
acquired an encrypted copy,no evidence,deleting mSecure will have no impact,only pertains to users that were synching with the mSecure Cloud,change their master password, change vital stored passwords. The page has no headcount, no date for when the copy was taken, and no field table. Leave those three blanks empty. A forwarded message does not fill them. - Open the security model and find
46-characterandnever stored on our servers, then the paragraph about the authentication email. Confirm that “the raw key is not on the server” and “an encrypted key is emailed” appear in the same notes. Then open the account-authentication page and read the iCloud Drive section. That is their published model. It is not a field list for this copy. - In a local note, write a string you will not use again, for example
desk-copy-20261105. On one test account you can change freely, replace it with a different string. The old string is still in the note. That is what “changing one place leaves a copy that already departed” looks like. Leave the bank, the main mailbox, and the master password out of this drill. - Use the same test account for a passkey. Open that site’s own sign-in security page and count the passkeys. Delete only the matching row inside the password manager, then reload the site’s security page. If the site’s list is still there, deleting the row did not unregister the key. To replace it, remove the old one on the site, then register a new one.
- Open the password generator. In the developer tools, open Network and preserve the log. In random mode, take the default of 16 characters or longer and generate one. Look at the URL, the query string, and the body of each new request. The string you just generated should not appear. Generation finishes in the browser, and the page opens without an account. Length can sit anywhere from 6 to 128 characters. Below 8, the page warns that the result is weaker, so a replacement password should stay above that line. Use a different password on each site. Do not copy the new master password onto the others.
- To see whether a string looks like a common weak password, open the strength check and type only the throwaway test string. The page requests
data/leaked-top10k.txt, currently 862 lines, opening with123456,password, andqwerty. After you type, the new requests should not contain that string. A hit means it looks like a weak password on this list. A miss means it is absent from these 862 lines. The list does not contain mSecure’s database, and it cannot say whether you are inside that encrypted copy. - If you already exported a CSV or a PDF, search the downloads folder on this machine by file name. A file you find there is plaintext. Leave it out of chat and out of an unencrypted cloud folder. When you need a copy to keep, use the file encryption box in the browser: AES-256-GCM, one file up to 5 GB, output as
.lockor.enc. The passwords themselves still have to be changed on each website. A plaintext dump of the whole vault is a poor way to hand them on.
How to hand a new password to someone else
If a colleague needs the new password, leave it out of the email body and out of chat history. Sent mail, a forward, and a lock-screen preview keep the body. The authentication notes already say a mailbox can hold, for a long time, an account key wrapped by the account password. Putting a fresh password in plaintext into that same mailbox adds another copy, and that copy is not protected by the 46-character key.
For a password the other person needs once, use a one-time link. The key sits after # in the URL, in the form s.html?id={id}#{key}. After the question mark there is only an id. The key does not ride on the HTTP request. The server stores ciphertext for a while, and a read burns it. Creating the link and opening it need no account. Why the fragment stays off the request line is in when you send a password once, why the decryption key belongs after # in the URL. What Sent, a forward, and a phone preview keep from an email body is in if you put a temporary password in an email, what Sent, forwards, and phone previews still keep.
A backup file you will open again belongs in the file encryption box, on this machine, with the same AES-256-GCM limit as the step above. MyPassGen does not keep a password vault, and it does not sync your rows. Generation, the strength check, the one-time link, and file encryption all finish in the browser. They open without an account. What can be done with the 5 November text is concrete: change the master password and the passwords on the accounts that can reset the others, reset two-factor authentication and passkeys on the website side, and deal with any plaintext you exported yourself. The notice never turns “no evidence the secrets were opened” into “the old passwords can stay on the other sites.”
FAQ
If there is no evidence the secrets were opened, can the stored passwords stay?
After “no evidence,” the longer reply still recommends changing the master password and the vital stored passwords, resetting two-factor authentication, and replacing passkeys. They call that usual practice. Usual practice is not a confirmation that the copy has been opened, and it does not make an old password expire on another site by itself. “Vital” comes with no list. Change the mailbox and the other accounts that can reset the rest, then payment and domain accounts. Editing a note inside the manager does not change the website.
The security notes say a 46-character key is unrealistic to guess. Does that mean this copy cannot be opened?
That figure is the security page’s arithmetic for guessing the 46-character random account key, under a speed they chose. It says that if the vault text is encrypted only by that random key, and the key is not on the server, then guessing the account password alone does not open the vault text. The November notice does not confirm that the taken copy matches this premise, and it does not list the fields in the copy. The account key in the mailbox, wrapped by the account password, sits outside that year-count. Keep both documents: the years on the older page, and the newer sentence that still recommends a change.
I never turned on cloud sync. Am I inside the scope sentence?
The reply says the issue only pertains to users who were synching with mSecure Cloud. If you never synced to that cloud, you are outside that sentence. The sentence does not cover plaintext you exported later, the authentication email in the mailbox, or reuse of the master password on other sites. The wrapped account key in that email, and the encrypted account key on iCloud, are storage locations the security notes and the authentication page already describe. The November notice does not place them inside this copy.
A local check missed. Does that mean I am absent from this copy?
No. The local list is 862 lines, and the comparison stays in the browser. It answers whether the string looks like a common weak password. It does not contain this company’s database, and it is not a substitute for a full-web lookup. After a miss, any site that still uses the old password still needs its own new one. Leave the password you still use out of the check.
Once the app is deleted, is the work finished?
The reply says deleting the app has no impact. Finished, for each website, means that site’s password is a new one, two-factor authentication has been reset there, and the passkey has been removed and created again on that site. A delete inside the manager does not stand in for the change on the website. Former users likewise do not get back a copy that has already left.
Do the check and the generator require an account? Is a live password uploaded?
No account is required. Generation and the strength check both finish in the browser. MyPassGen does not keep a password vault, and it does not sync rows to a server. The check you can see is Network: the word-list file may appear, and the string you typed or just generated should not appear on the request line or in the body. The words on the page are confirmed by that look.